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From the Obligation of Birth to the Obligation of Care: (VSRVLWR¶V Biophilosophy and 
5HFDOFDWL¶V µ1HZ 6\PSWRPV¶ 
 
Abstract: This essay addresses the controversial status of subjectivity in (VSRVLWR¶V affirmative 
biopolitics and articulates it using 5HFDOFDWL¶V psychoanalytical theory, with the aim of 
promoting a non-vitalistic affirmative biopolitics. In biopolitical theory in general, and in 
(VSRVLWR¶V especially, subjectivity has a problematic status: while life precedes 
intersubjectivity, it is not clear whether subjectivity is regarded as a consequence or as the 
precondition of intersubjectivity (and thus of life). Esposito acknowledges such an aporia, the 
subjectum suppositum, but fails to recognise it in his own reasoning, ultimately envisioning a 
powerful interpretative and transformative paradigm²affirmative biopolitics²whilst leaving 
at its core a life-less subject. In this essay, I read (VSRVLWR¶V affirmative biopolitics through 
5HFDOFDWL¶V clinical approach to the µnew symptoms¶ with the aim of envisioning a subjectivity 
compatible with the ontogenetic primacy of life posited by biopolitical theory. Ultimately, the 
aim of this article is to suggest that an affirmative biopolitics, grounded on the promotion of 
neither a pre-subjective bare life, nor of a lifeless subject, but of a fully subjective life, a living 
subject is possible. 
 
 
In this paper I analyse the notion of subjectivity in (VSRVLWR¶V proposal for an affirmative 
biopolitics in relation to 5HFDOFDWL¶V psychoanalytical (Lacanian) theory of the µQHZ 
V\PSWRPV¶. I aim to promote a non-vitalistic affirmative biopolitics through a critical 
discussion of subjectivity; and mutatis mutandis envision a subjectivity compatible with the 
ontogenetic primacy of life posited by biopolitical theory. My aim is therefore to advance a 
possible affirmative acceptation of biopolitics, grounded neither on the notion of a pre-
subjective bare life, nor on that of a lifeless subject, but on a more articulated, fully subjective 
life, a living subject. 
It is no longer 2006, when Campbell could quite rightly maintain that µWKH name of 
Roberto Esposito is largely unknown in the 86¶ (Campbell 2006: 2) (and in Anglophone 
academia, we should add). The consequence of µWKH appearance of Bios LWVHOI¶ in its µGLVFORVXUH 
of how >«@ categories of political philosophy >«@ block the emergence of a vital SROLWLFV¶ 
(Campbell 2006: 19) are now old news; Esposito¶V oeuvre is available in translation and his 
reflections have been studied extensively. However, not much scholarship on Esposito 
problematises the vitalist foundations of his biophilosophy. This is surprising: Bird and Short, 
in their timely and rich collection of essays, signal that µLQ the burgeoning English literature on 
Esposito, a single question is constantly raised about his work: ³ZKDW kind of politics can come 
from such an approach"´¶ (Bird and Short 2013: 2). If the answer is to be an µDIILUPDWLYH 
ELRSROLWLFV¶ a politics of life, which stems from life itself to foster and protect it ± the answer 
that Esposito himself would probably give ± a problematisation of the vitalist premises of such 
a biophilosophy is pivotal. Scholarship has rather focused on Esposito¶V analysis of 
personhood, strangely disregarding the fact that his notion of the impersonal cannot be thought 
without the biological notion of life, with all the vitalist implications this entails. For instance, 
while Bird very aptly proposes introducing the notion of µVRFLDOLW\¶ in assessing the ethical 
implications of (VSRVLWR¶V paradigm of communitas ± in order to rectify its otherwise rather 
µDVFHWLF¶ and µFROG¶ functioning (Bird 2013: 45) ± he does not mention the notion of life. In the 
same volume, two other papers address the vitalist core of (VSRVLWR¶V biophilosophy from the 
perspective of gender: the reduction of a womaQ¶V role to maternity (Deutscher 2013: 50) and 
(VSRVLWR¶V actual neglect of sexual difference ± to the point that 2¶%\UQH ironically suggests 
writing a sister volume to Communitas entitled µCommunitas: This Time with Sex and Women¶ 
(2¶%\UQH 2013: 126). In the same year, Kordela returns to biological matters in (VSRVLWR¶V 
philosophy and identifies the issue of µEORRG¶ with the conceptual moment in which Esposito 
eventually manages to µFDSWXUH LPPDQHQFH¶ (Kordela 2013: 165). According to Kordela, that 
which allows us to grasp the transhistorical nature of the biopolitical paradigm and its logic is 
µWKH prohibition of self-referentiality on the level of EORRG¶ ± that is to say, the prohibition of 
incest (Kordela 2013: 182). 
But these contributions do not exhaust the issue of biological life and vitalism in the 
foundations of (VSRVLWR¶V thought. The additional issue is that, the moment we turn our 
attention to the life at the core of (VSRVLWR¶V biophilosophy we are confronted with another, 
possibly more problematic notion ± that of subjectivity, a notion that was disregarded not only 
by Esposito himself, but also by the scholarship on Esposito and, I would say, in general, by 
Italian biopolitical theory. While life has been unquestionably regarded as the precondition for 
both intersubjectivity and politics, subjectivity is assumed to pre-exist political relationships 
while, at the same time, it is regarded as a mere consequence of such relationships, almost as a 
byproduct of them. Within such a conceptualisation, subjectivity paradoxically emerges as both 
the pre-condition of any political discourse and a consequence of relations of power, therefore 
further problematising the relationship between subjectivity and life itself. In Pensiero vivente, 
Esposito actually praises Italian biopolitical theory precisely for having avoided the above 
impasse, that is to say for having µ³mundanised´ the VXEMHFW¶ and thus criticised the subjectum 
suppositum, a µILJXUH posited on itself that is at the same time the substance on which it is 
SRVLWHG¶ and which is clearly aporetic (Esposito 2010: 30).1 
As Tarizzo has it, however, Esposito himself does not completely escape the aporia of 
the subjectum suppositum:  
A subject, however weakened and cross-H\HG¶ is nonetheless there. Esposito 
tries to µVXEVWLWXWH the semantics of life to that of subjectivity, reducing the 
subject to a mere effect of something, that is to say, life, which always precedes 
it and of which the subject would only be an epiphenomenon (Tarizzo 2011: 
436).  
 
Undoubtedly, I agree with Tarizzo when he maintains that µWhe more we venture on this 
road >«@ the more we fall into a metaphysics of OLIH¶ (Tarizzo 2011: 436). In brief: even if we 
                                                 
1
 All citations from Italian sources have been translated by the author of this essay. 
want to deal solely with (VSRVLWR¶V formulation of impersonal politics, we cannot disregard 
that his is a biophilosophy, a philosophy of biopolitics whose ultimate aim is to think biopolitics 
affirmatively. The moment we turn our attention to the life that is at the core of this reflection, 
the notion of subjectivity rears its ugly head as an uninvited guest shaking the very scaffolding 
of (VSRVLWR¶V affirmative biopolitics and revealing its concealed metaphysical vitalism: thus, 
ultimately confirming that affirmative biopolitics and thanatopolitics do not rest on very 
different ontological premises after all. 
 
Subjectivity: The uninvited guest of biopolitics (and what we can do about it) 
In his famous theorisation, Esposito posits that the communitas is grounded on the munus of 
subjectivity itself, a gift that, in his own words, µFDQQRW be not JLYHQ¶ If life ± logically, 
ontologically and ontogenetically ± precedes subjectivity, what is it that is donated to form the 
community? And if immunitas ± the avoidance of the munus ± is not exactly the opposite of 
the communitas but its necessary counterpart, a certain amount of which is fundamental for the 
wellbeing of the community, how can this subject-less life immunise itself? Does this life µKDYH 
an opaque sense of self and a dark will of sustenance and self-preservation that is preliminary 
and presupposed to the process of immunisation"¶ (Tarizzo 2011: 436). From the ontological 
idea that gestation and birth metaphorically epitomise the perfect permeability of communitas 
and immunitas, Esposito concludes that on an ethical level, birth cannot be not given ± 
implicitly overlapping birth and the munus. Such primacy accorded to birth, and the consequent 
establishment of a metaphysics of life, is not without severe consequences. As Chiesa has 
argued, (VSRVLWR¶V affirmative biopolitics reaches a µELR-theo-SROLWLFDO¶ dead end, sanctioning 
very clearly the µREOLJDWLRQ of ELUWK¶ and thus drawing dangerously close to extreme pro-life 
stances (Chiesa 2011: 110). 
The tension between an implicit, µFURVV-H\HG¶ and overshadowed semantics of 
subjectivity and an imposing and enthusiastic semantics of life persists in (VSRVLWR¶V thought 
well beyond his germinal works Communitas and Immunitas. The shadows of the onto-ethical 
obligation of birth and the bio-theo-political drift still fall on his recent book Le persone e le 
cose. Here, he advocates µUH-opening the horizons of the mind to the vitality of the ERG\¶ in 
order to re-establish a µFRQWDFW with the very origins of OLIH¶: 
Reason prevails on the body inasmuch as µRQH¶V RZQ¶ [il proprio] prevails on 
the common, the private on the public and the individual profit on the collective 
interest. This happens when the urge to immunity prevails on the passion for 
the community. To protect themselves, human beings compress the power of 
the body within control apparatuses that bond them to the established order of 
the time. (Esposito 2014: iii, 2) 
 
It is as if life possessed some kind of implicit altruism that could exuberantly quench the 
egotistic whims of individual subjectivity. In Le persone e le cose Esposito mentions the notion 
of the µVXEMHFW¶ only in passing, in reference to other philosophers (such as Locke, Descartes 
and Kant), but does not thematise it, invoking as the only possible future for the community 
the enthusiastic acceptance of a (de-subjectivised) vitalism of the body. 
Thus, even if the semantics of subjectivity, as Tarizzo notes, has been overshadowed 
by the overgrown apparatus of the semantics of life, it is still there, however µFURVV-H\HG¶ even 
later in (VSRVLWR¶V work on personhood. This is why my reading of (VSRVLWR¶V biophilosophy 
starts from subjectivity rather than avoiding it. In other words, instead of trying to read 
(VSRVLWR¶V thought in between the contrasting dynamics of (absent) subjects and (exalted) life, 
I believe that it is possible to identify a notion of the subject that does not overshadow life, and 
that could even make life ± biological life ± a central feature of subjectivity: a subjectivised 
life, a subjectivity for the biopolitical age. 
My purpose, on a much smaller scale, is in line with %UHX¶V to contribute to the 
theorisation of a µOHIWLVW RQWRORJ\¶, capable of mending the poststructuralist criticism of the 
biological yet at the same time recognising that the materiality of the biological poses limits to 
discursive constructions (Breu 2009: 187±188). Breu looks to Lacan¶V psychoanalytic theory 
to solve the surprisingly idealistic deadlock ± as he calls it ± faced by biopolitical theories. 
Breu thinks that Lacan can offer, µSHUKDSV uniquely among contemporary theoretical 
perspectives, >«@ a theory of the relationship between language and materiality that does not 
simply or immediately subsume the latter term to the former category or vice YHUVD¶ (Breu 
2009: 189). The theory thus enables us to µDWWHQ>G@ to the productive and constitutive work 
done by language via the V\PEROLF¶ while, at the same time µWKHRULVLQJ the limits of the 
linguistic and the equally constitutive dimensions of desire and PDWHULDOLW\¶ (Breu 2009: 193).  
To this end, I will turn to /DFDQ¶V theory of the ontogenesis of the subject, especially 
as it was received by the Italian psychoanalyst Massimo Recalcati. Lacan claims that we, as 
humans, come into being as helpless creatures, anatomically inadequate for surviving in the 
world. This condition sets in motion a process that indissolubly ties subjectivity with otherness 
± the ontogenesis of the subject. Life and subjectivity ± in the homo sapiens ± are thus co-
substantial (or, better still, co-in-substantial): life does not persist without the advent of 
subjectivity qua otherness, which emerges to make up for a constitutive deficiency in human 
biology, and in human life itself. 
By reading (VSRVLWR¶V proposal for an affirmative biopolitics through /DFDQ¶V theory of 
the subject, I hope to show that the bio-theo-political impasse and, ultimately, metaphysical 
vitalism, can be avoided in theorising an affirmative and immanent declension of biopolitics.  
While it is only in his latest book Le parole e le cose that Esposito refers more 
extensively to Lacan, echoes of Lacanian theory sound throughout his oeuvre. This is all the 
more evident if we reconstruct not so much (VSRVLWR¶V relationship with Lacan, but rather his 
dialogue with Recalcati. It is by directly referring to the ODWWHU¶V work that Esposito proposes 
rather clear correspondences between his system of thought and Lacanian psychoanalysis. In a 
footnote in Pensiero vivente, Esposito defines 5HFDOFDWL¶V /¶XRPR senza inconscio as µD 
precious re-elaboration in psychoanalysis of the paradigm of immunisation¶ (Esposito 2010: 
248n). More recently, in reviewing 5HFDOFDWL¶V Jacques Lacan, Esposito hints at a 
correspondence between his own paradigm of immunisation and /DFDQ¶V theory of the 
ontogenesis of the subject. On the one hand, Esposito equates the excess of immunisation to 
an µLQDQH attempt at mending RQH¶V original IDXOW¶ On the other, he mentions a possible 
correspondence between communitas and the symbolic order, µXQGHUVWRRG as a request for 
reciprocal recognition, as the law of speech and JLIW¶ (Esposito 2012). Finally, in Le persone e 
le cose, Esposito directly engages with /DFDQ¶V theory, especially with his notion of Das Ding 
in connection with the Real (Esposito 2014: ii, 5). 
For his part, Recalcati often mentions (VSRVLWR¶V immunitas, seemingly as a paradigm 
for interpreting intersubjective psychoanalytical notions in a wider socio-political key. He 
claims that Esposito elaborates, on a political level, the µSDUDGR[ of a tendency towards self-
preservation that flows into the self-destruction by incentivising self-preservation LWVHOI¶ 
(Recalcati 2010: V, n3). 5HFDOFDWL¶V proposal for a µFOLQLF of HPSWLQHVV¶ ± which is his proposal 
for a psychoanalytical clinical approach to µQHZ V\PSWRPV¶ such as anorexia, bulimia, 
addictions, etc. ± could even be read, I contend, as a clinical approach to the extreme 
consequences of an excess of immunisation on the single individual subject. More recently, 
Recalcati openly declared his esteem for (VSRVLWR¶V biophilosophy, which, in his review of Le 
parole e le cose, he considers as µRQH of the most original and innovative philosophical 
explorations of the past twenty \HDUV¶ (Recalcati 2014). 
Articulating 5HFDOFDWL¶V Lacanian notion of the subject with (VSRVLWR¶V paradigm of 
immunisation enables us to achieve a twofold result. On the one hand, and most importantly, 
it enables us to shift the focus of biopolitical paradigms, bioethical debates, and with it, our 
understanding of biological normativity, from the life-in-potency of the foetus to a life-in-act, 
a living, self-conscious, subjectivised life. This shift in premises ultimately leads, I believe, to 
rephrasing (VSRVLWR¶V onto-ethical obligation of birth, the ur-protection of a transcendental life-
in-potency, into an ethical obligation of care, the protection of an immanent subjectivised life 
always-already thrown into a communal relationship. This, I believe, could partially address 
the still very actual need to theorise an affirmative biopolitics, that is to say a politics capable 
of channelling biological normativity to fostering and protecting life without appealing to a 
dogmatic metaphysics of life. 
On the other hand, on a more theoretical level, the Esposito/Recalcati articulation shows 
that Italian theory, far from exclusively being a political philosophy, has also had a strong 
influence on Italian psychoanalysis, to the point that a certain reception of Lacanian 
psychoanalytic theory (e.g. Recalcati¶V) could be considered an integral part of the field of 
µ,WDOLDQ WKHRU\¶. This, in virtue of the patent connection it establishes between bare life and 
subjectivity and of its rather humanist, even µRSHUDWLRQDO¶ reading of /DFDQ¶V theory ± which 
some theorists might define as µG\QDPLF usage¶ whether positively (Rabaté 2004: xiv) or 
negatively (Chiesa 2007: 3). 
 
Communitas and immunitas: The genesis of the onto-ethical obligation of birth 
Famously, Esposito derives his interpretation of communitas from its etymology. Communitas 
is composed of cum- [with], µWKDW which is not RQH¶V RZQ¶ and munus, the gift that µLV given 
because it must be given and it cannot be not JLYHQ¶ (Esposito 1998: xii, xiv). The munus is the 
gift µRI [an] initial property [:] VXEMHFWLYLW\¶ (xvi). Individuals are not µLQGHSHQGHQW DWRPV¶ of 
the community, ready to realise themselves upon establishing a relationship with the other. On 
the contrary, the µLQGLYLGXDO subject, undivided, far from being an unaware part of the 
community, is precisely what hinders LW¶ (Esposito 1998: 74). 
Immunitas is instead the avoidance of the munus. On the one hand, this can be 
understood on a socio-political level, as the µRULJLQDO autonomy, or [...] a subsequent exemption 
from a previously incurred GHEW¶ (Esposito 2002: 8). On the other hand, immunitas can be read 
through biomedical language as a µFRQGLWLRQ of resistance of the organism towards the risk of 
contracting an LOOQHVV¶ (Esposito 2002: 9). If we consider both levels (socio-political and 
biomedical) simultaneously, it becomes clear that as much as there is no un-immunised body, 
there equally cannot exist a communitas without a certain amount of immunitas. Like the 
human body, the community needs some level of protection and immunisation: on a macro-
social level, this is a condition of affirmative biopolitics. The social body is barely immunised 
from both the outside and the inside: it is µSRURXV¶ (Esposito 2008: 26). On the other hand, 
though, the risk is that µimmunisation, which is necessary to protect life, if brought beyond a 
certain threshold, ends up disallowing LW¶ (Esposito 2005: 161). On a macro-social level, this is 
the opposite of an affirmative biopolitics: it is thanatopolitics, an exertion of ruthless biopower. 
With the paradigm of immunisation, Esposito seals the overlapping of biological and socio-
political levels: the community and the living body work (or should work) in the same way. 
According to Esposito, gestation, pregnancy and birth epitomise the porous balance 
between communitas and immunitas, the ideal state in which immunisation and community 
permeate each other; and immunity serves as a protection to the community and not to its 
dispersion: 
Pregnancy is precisely the diversity of two organisms that come into contact to 
protect the product of their union. The mother is different from the child and 
the child from the mother. Yet this diversity is the spark of life. [His] own 
mother, [...] carried him inside herself fighting against him in the tension of two 
different and opposed immune systems >«@ Birth constitutes the original point 
in which immunitas is one and the same with communitas [...]. The newborn is 
the singular, but also infinitely plural, bearer of the munus. (Esposito 2005: 165, 
166) 
 
Drawing on these considerations, Esposito reaches ominous conclusions, eventually 
sanctioning the sacredness of pre-natal life and, as Chiesa contends: 
Suggesting that the acknowledgement of biological birth as a binding gift is by 
itself a necessary and sufficient condition for the foundation of the humanitas of 
man, his symbolic²and ultimately blessed²communitarian dimension. And 
this is so because, before becoming the object of any bio-ethical legislation, birth 
and the ontological obligation it carries with it directly issue from ³WKH force of 
life LWVHOI´ the ur-protection of a life that is otherwise as yet unprotected. (Chiesa 
2011: 110) 
 
If not a Catholic pro-life position outright, this at least indicates the presence of a strong 
metaphysical vitalism in (VSRVLWR¶V affirmative biopolitics. Is it possible to think biopolitics 
affirmatively without necessarily regarding life as blessed and birth as an onto-ethical 
obligation? In other words: is affirmative biopolitics necessarily vitalistic and pro-life, and does 
it have to forsake the notion of µVXEMHFWLYLW\¶ entirely? 
Dealing with the notion of subjectivity in Esposito¶V biophilosophy is crucial for 
questioning the prescriptive drift of his affirmative biopolitics. Subjectivity can no longer be 
regarded as that which is paradoxically donated ± as the munus ± for the coming into being of 
the community: this would be an aporetic subjectum suppositum, which comes into being the 
moment it has to be donated. This theoretical operation eventually leads to dismissing, as 
Esposito does, the subject as that which is either donated or that which hinders the community, 
at the same time elevating life (as birth) to the beating metaphorical heart of communal 
existence. Yet the reintroduction of subjectivity into the discourse would entail neither 
ascribing a strong substantive existence to the subject, nor denying that it indeed comes into 
being the moment it is donated, nor abstracting it from its biological life. To maintain these 
premises while at the same time returning the subject to a central foundational and non-aporetic 
role in the coming-into-being of the community is to think subjectivity in terms of continuous 
ontogenesis rather than static (and possibly transcendental) ontology. A re-thought immanent 
and living subjectivity could then take the place of the transcendent notion of life that is the 
beating heart of the community. 
In order to think of the subject in such a way, almost as a conceptual bridge between 
bare life and the political, I believe it is first necessary, as previously mentioned, to look at 
/DFDQ¶V theory of the ontogenesis of the subject. 
 
Subjectivity and bare life in Lacan  
According to Lacan, the whole process of the ontogenesis of the subject is set into motion 
because humankind is born biologically premature. And because of this initial inadequacy, 
which will then be elevated to µODFN¶ upon entrance into the symbolic order, the human being 
is caught up in an alienating relationship with its own bodily image first, and then with the 
Other, from which it will never recover. In other words, this initial inadequacy constitutes the 
subject in its intrinsic characteristic of being secondary to intersubjectivity. 
The LQIDQW¶V organic inadequacy involves a radical vulnerability. Unlike most primates, 
the infant cannot provide for itself, and depends on the other to fulfil its elementary needs. 
Communicating these needs is hence the key to primary survival: needs become demands. The 
infant must tell the Other (the first nourishing figure, usually the mother) what it needs, so that 
the Other can provide it. This is the central moment in which biological inadequacy becomes 
lack, the moment that turns the state of biological inadequacy in which we come into being 
into a linguistic request; the bridge, if you will, between nature and culture, between the organic 
bare life and bios. 
In Seminar XI, Lacan spells out this ontogenesis with two µRSHUDWLRQV¶ Alienation 
(which involves also aphanisis ± fading, disappearance) and Separation. Through alienation in 
language, the first moment of the ontogenesis of the subject, the subject appears only µLQ the 
Other, in so far as the first signifier >«@ emerges in the field of the Other and represents the 
subject for another signifier, which other signifier has as its effect the aphanisis of the VXEMHFW¶ 
(Lacan 1998: 218). The signifier manifests the subject to the Other but in doing so it also 
reduces µWKH subject in question to being no more than a signifier, to petrify the subject in the 
same movement in which it calls the subject to function, to speak, as VXEMHFW¶ (Lacan 1998: 
207). Alienation, that is, µFRQGHPQs the subject to appearing >«@ on the one side as meaning, 
produced by the signifier [and] on the other as aphanisis¶ (Lacan 1998: 210). Lacan gives a 
simple explanatory example. A mugger attacks a person and exclaims: µ<RXU money or your 
OLIH¶ If one chooses to keep the money, one dies, thus losing both life and money. If one 
chooses to live, one chooses a deprived life, a life deprived of money (Lacan 1998: 210). 
According to Lacan, being and meaning (to be and to be a signifier in the field of the Other) 
are in the same logical relationship as money and life in the above crime: in coming into being 
as a subject, one loses being (a substantive, independent, imaginary and possibly psychotic 
subjectivity) in order to mean, that is, to become a signifier in the field of the Other. If one 
were to choose being instead of meaning, one would cease to exist (thus it is a paradoxically 
forced choice): this is the inaugural operation of the subject as manque-à-être, want-to-be, lack-
of-being. 
However, if µWKHUH is no subject without, somewhere, aphanisis of the VXEMHFW¶ (Lacan 
1998: 221), the operation of alienation/aphanisis only sets into motion the ontogenesis of the 
subject. We still need to add a third moment to complete the logic of Oedipus. A third element 
enters the stage before the advent of the non-psychotic subject: the Name-of-the-Father ± the 
function that effects separation in the relationship between the child and the mother. In Seminar 
XI, in relation to the diptych of alienation/aphanisis, Lacan calls this further µRSHUDWLRQ¶ 
separation: µWKDW by which the subject finds the return way of the vel of alienation [and] finds, 
one might say, the weak point of the primal dyad of the signifying DUWLFXODWLRQ¶ (Lacan 1998: 
218). In other words, in separation, one finds out that the Other is also lacking (that is to say: 
the Other desires) and that the object of the 2WKHU¶V desire is oneself. Thus the subject finds out 
that he himself can be lacking to the Other, and therefore that it is possible to fade ± aphanisis 
± from the field of the Other. The subject eventually lodges his own manque-à-être at the level 
of the signifying chain: the lack of the Other and the lack of the subject overlap. Separare: to 
separate oneself; but also se-parare: to engender oneself, says Lacan. 
Simplifying, with alienation the subject avoids hallucinating the filling of his own 
manque in an idyllic, primeval, imaginary wholeness ± which never really existed since, after 
all, lack rests on an unsurmountable biological inadequacy. With separation, the subject avoids 
the opposite: to protect oneself from the aphanisis of being in a complete fusion with the all-
caring Other: neither solipsism nor a return to the womb can in fact fill the manque. Nothing 
can. The subject thus comes into being as a desiring subject, desiring specifically insofar as it 
lacks being. Alienation and separation inaugurate the process of subjectification qua desire of 
the Other that will accompany the individual throughout his life, almost as a neoteny, in which 
the original biological inadequacy of the infant continues to dwell. That the subject undergoes 
a separation from the Other means that the subject cannot blissfully glide into a complete fusion 
with the Other, thus avoiding his constitutional inadequacy and the symbolised lack: he must 
separate and ± as Lacan says ± paradoxically µreturn¶ to his own aphanisis and constantly 
attempt to µRYHUFRPH LW¶ as a desiring subject. That might be said to be the ethics of desire: 
facing RQH¶V own aphanisis cannot be avoided and facing it means to desire, to displace the 
unfillable emptiness of aphanisis in a lack. In other words, one is only insofar as one is with 
and within the Other. 
Before returning to Esposito and drawing out some correspondences between /DFDQ¶V 
formulation and (VSRVLWR¶V biophilosophy, I still want to briefly examine two psychoanalytical 
ideas: /DFDQ¶V theory of the four discourses, which allows me to connect the theory of the 
ontogenesis of the subject to macro-social and political levels, and 5HFDOFDWL¶V clinical 
application of this theory ± since it is precisely with and through 5HFDOFDWL¶V clinical work that 
Lacanian theory finds its point of entrance and contact with (VSRVLWR¶V biophilosophy. 
 
Recalcati: Psychoanalysis in the discursive regime of the capitalist 
5HFDOFDWL¶V clinical interest lies in the treatment of so-called µQHZ V\PSWRPV¶ such as eating 
disorders and addictions ± µQHZ¶ not because they did not exist in the past, but because their 
prevalence has considerably increased in recent years. According to Recalcati, the reason for 
this increase is a radical shift in social relations, namely the rise of the discourse of the capitalist 
or better still, the entrance into the discursive regime of the capitalist. In Seminar XVII, Lacan 
(2007a) posits that macro- and micro-social relations can be reduced to four fundamental 
discursive models (Master, University, Analyst, Hysteric). A discourse has four elements 
(Master Signifier, the Other, the object petit a, and the barred subject). These can occupy one 
of four invariable positions, which are that of the agent, other, truth, and product/loss, thus 
generating a new discourse for each position they occupy. The elements do not roam freely in 
these positions; they undergo orderly permutations: a revolution in the discursive regime 
beyond a shift from one of the four discourses to the next in the chain of permutations is not 
possible. In seminar XVIII, however, Lacan (2007b) introduces a fifth discourse, that of the 
capitalist, noting therefore a profound change in the discursive paradigm of the contemporary 
era that does not follow the rules of permutation of the previous four discourses. 
According to Recalcati, Freudian psychoanalysis ± before the discourse of the 
capitalist, that is ± dealt with neurotic symptoms within the social theory that Freud expounded 
in Civilisation and its Discontents and that could be interpreted through /DFDQ¶V theory of the 
four discourses. Simply put, in order to be part of the social whole, the subject has to partly 
relinquish his drives, namely renouncing their immediate satisfaction, to change them, and 
subject them to social control and acceptance. The compensation for this sacrifice is on the one 
hand participation in civilisation, and on the other hand the paradoxical enjoyment of sacrifice 
itself: foregoing satisfaction becomes a paradoxical (and Kantian) mode of enjoyment. 
In the discursive regime of the capitalist, however, the imperative is not to relinquish 
enjoyment for the greater good, but to indulge in it. µ(QMR\¶ is the new imperative. The position 
of the agent ± in the discursive structure ± is occupied by the barred subject (qua consumer), 
who addresses the Market as master signifier. Through the Market, the subject can ask 
µknowledge¶, i.e. science and technology, to produce objects to be consumed, i.e. commodities, 
that is to say: jouissance. But in the position of truth is the master signifier, which urges the 
subject to enjoy. Without going into detail ± many have written on this discourse, arguing about 
whether it is a fifth discourse or if it inaugurates a new universe with four new discourses, as 
Bryant (2008) seems to suggest ± let me stick with 5HFDOFDWL¶V reading: µLQ the discourse of the 
capitalist [...] the dominant agent is the subject who feverishly demands new objects of 
jouissance, it is the subject whose lack is reduced to the status of an avid emptiness that requires 
only its own compulsive ILOOLQJ¶ (Recalcati 2011: 20): 
The object not only relates no longer to the needs of the subject, but it is also 
unrelated to his own desire. The object, instead of satisfying or tending to 
satisfy, engenders new pseudo-lacks so that the demand for new objects 
continues to reproduce itself infinitely. The discourse of the capitalist opens up 
in the subject artificial holes, and, at the same time, it offers the illusion that 
there are objects capable of filling them. (Recalcati 2011: 20) 
 
Drawing on Adorno, Recalcati concludes that this discourse produces an effect of extreme 
individualisation ± it produces a monadic individual: µDQ unlimited affirmation of the individual 
that ends up sanctioning the suppression of subjectivity, overturning it into its opposite. The 
³XQOHDVKHG´ individual [...] for whom everything becomes possible, defeats the VXEMHFW¶V bond 
with the SROLV¶ (Recalcati 2010: xi, 2). 
 In order to understand the effects of the entrance of the capitalist into the discursive 
regime, Recalcati introduces a dichotomy between the subject and the individual into his 
psychoanalytic theory. In strict Lacanian terms, an µindividual¶ should rather be considered a 
psychotic subject, in that it faces aphanisis without symbolic mediation and substitutes it (not 
consciously of course) with a µSURIXVLRQ >«@ into which the central signal of a possible 
mediation is introduced in a deformed and profoundly asymbolic IDVKLRQ¶ (Lacan 1997: 87). 
However, for Recalcati it is important to introduce a non-psychotic notion of individuality, in 
order to account for a mode of subjectification (or more properly de-subjectification) that he 
considers typical of the discourse of the capitalist. The hyperindividualisation of subjectivity 
in the discursive regime of the capitalist consists of the emergence of a profound distinction 
between individuality and subjectivity, individualism and subjectification: there is no such 
thing, Freud and Lacan show Recalcati and us, as an individual as such, an undivided subject; 
there is no such thing as a monadic individual subjectivity because subjectivity is always 
hetero-constructed. Individuality and subjectivity are thus at odds: where there is individuality 
there is no subjectivity, that is to say, in a dynamic framework, where there is individualisation 
there is no subjectification: embracing a paradigm of hyper-individualism means to relinquish 
subjectivity and, with it, the intersubjectivity with which it is constitutionally interlinked. This 
is precisely the tendency in the discursive regime of the capitalist: an urge towards 
individualisation ± thus in psychoanalytic terms, an urge towards the delusion of an 
independent and undivided µVXEMHFW¶ 
The subject is not an individual, first of all because it is not undivided, but 
constitutionally divided. This division of the subject implies, at the same time, 
its loneliness, but also, differently from the individualistic monad, its non-self-
sufficiency, hence its bond to the Other. [...] As manque-a-être, caused by the 
action of the Other, the subject turns to the field of the Other to cure it, to 
alleviate it. In this sense, Lacan can affirm that the desire of the subject is always 
desire of the Other. Here we might be touching the most important point of the 
difference between subject and individual: as manque-a-être and desire, the 
subject, differently from the imaginary compactness of the monadic individual, 
is open onto the Other, hence it is anti-monadic par excellence. (Recalcati, 2010: 
xi, 2) 
 
However, psychoanalysis does not imply a µVWUXFWXUDOLVW erasure of the subject, a reduction to 
a mere effect of the signifier in the signifying FKDLQ¶ but tries to maintain µWKH singular 
GLVFRQWLQXLW\¶ in spite of and within the VXEMHFW¶V µGHSHQGHQFH of the action of the VWUXFWXUH¶ 
(Recalcati 2010: iii, 2). 
In the regime of the discourse of the capitalist, therefore, new symptoms emerge that 
are no longer metaphorical expressions of repressed desires and traumas. Rather, they let a 
disquieting absence emerge ± an emptiness, a void ± in which the subject precipitates or from 
which it runs, terrorised ± and, in topological terms, this void appears in that place at the 
ontological and ontogenetic centre of the subject where there was lack. This emptiness can no 
longer sustain desire in that it is lack (of being) that causes desire to arise (Lacan 1991: 139) 
as a means not to fill or disregard lack itself but to subjectivise it, to juxtapose it with the lack 
of the Other and engender the subject qua intersubjectivity. µ'HVLUH¶ says Recalcati, µdoes not 
feed itself so much on objects as much as it feeds on ERQGV¶ (Recalcati 2011: 22): desire is 
always desire of the Other.  
Several questions certainly remain open at this point: is the new psychopathology of 
everyday life not neurotic but psychotic, as Recalcati seems to suggest? Is 5HFDOFDWL¶V message 
somewhat messianic: are we witnessing the end of times, or at least the end of the subject of 
the unconscious and the end of psychoanalysis as we know it? In spite of the legitimate doubts 
5HFDOFDWL¶V theory may kindle, these questions cannot be answered in the limited space of this 
paper. 
Following 5HFDOFDWL¶V argument, we see that the main cause of the new symptoms 
within the discourse of the capitalist is the dissolution of the community, and its related 
individualistic (thus anti-subjective and consequently anti-psychoanalytical) forma mentis: 
The hypermodern era is the era of atomised individualism that imposes itself on 
the community, it is the era of the narcissistic cult of the Ego and of the 
compulsive drive to immediate Jouissance, that disrupt the circuit of 
sublimation of the drive, imposing themselves as a novel form of µSHUIRUPDQFH 
SULQFLSOH¶ that places Jouissance as a new superegoic obligation. (Recalcati 
2010: Introduction, 5) 
 
We can therefore conclude that new symptoms derive from a dissolution of the community and 
from a corresponding hyper-individualistic trend: they are, it seems, the consequence of what 
Esposito defines through his paradigm of immunisation as auto-immune drifts, a community 
that loses its µSRURVLW\¶ and whose immune response turns against what it should be protecting. 
 From the obligation of birth to the obligation of care 
The bridge between Lacanian psychoanalytical theory (via Recalcati) and (VSRVLWR¶V 
biophilosophy follows the path of the µQHZ V\PSWRPV¶ (VSRVLWR¶V communitas overlaps with 
Lacanian intersubjectivity, the Symbolic, the Other: µWKH plane of the Symbolic, of the 
relationships with the Other, understood as a request of reciprocal recognition, as the law of 
speech and JLIW¶ (Esposito 2012), Esposito tells us. Entrance into the communitas requires a 
munus, a gift that is given because it cannot be not given. Entrance into the intersubjective, 
communitarian relationship, into the Symbolic order, requires the fading of being: subjects 
come into being as lacking being itself, they come into being as relational signposts for the 
Other. This entails a munus, the aphanisis of being that produces the subject as manque-à-être. 
The subject comes into being as alienation in the Other, but its ontogenesis is not complete 
until a certain distance ± a gap, µZLWKRXW which anything could be WKHUH¶ (Lacan 1998: 206) 
± lodges itself between the subject and the Other, in the operation complementary to alienation: 
separation. 
Aphanisis of being, to put it simply, cannot correspond to a total fading into the Other. 
Aphanisis of being cannot be an µH[FXVH¶ for the subject to be only the other, to embrace a 
complete, total and blissful alienation in the Other. A separation must divide the two, and the 
ethical responsibility of the subject thus becomes being a subject in that place where there is 
constant exposure to aphanisis. This ethical responsibility is not, of course, separation itself, 
which is not an µHWKLFDO¶ operation that can be consciously deployed. Separation corresponds 
to immunitas, not yet as an autoimmune drift, not yet as a total exemption from the munus and 
the debt, but as a necessary counterpart to the dissolution into the community: µ6HSDUDWLRQ [...] 
is never a liquidation of the Other, but it always implies opening onto the Other. It does not 
erase the debt, but it assumes and oversteps it, because only by assuming it we can overcome 
LW¶ Recalcati tells us (Recalcati 2010: iv, 2). The subject is thus µD subject exposed onto its own 
otherness, [that] does not identify with itself but neither does it lose itself in the other¶, claims 
Esposito (2012). 
 The hyperindividualism of the discourse of the capitalist corresponds instead to the 
over-immunisation of auto-immune syndromes in (VSRVLWR¶V paradigm of immunisation: a 
hyper-immunisation against contamination from the other creates such a deep fracture that it 
turns against itself, fracturing the very subject, ripping it from the Other, disallowing 
intersubjectivity and thus the very condition of subjectivity itself. 
Certainly it would be misleading, to say the least, to consider µDOLHQDWLRQ¶ and 
µVHSDUDWLRQ¶ ± but also munus, communitas and immunitas ± as µentities¶ ethical constructs or 
conscious operations that we could just deploy, a là  Foucauldian µWRROER[¶, as an emergency 
(political/social/ethical) measure when our biopolitics risks turning into a thanatopolitics, as if 
we could suddenly µVXEMHFWLI\¶ the communitas and make biopolitics truly affirmative. 
Reintroducing subjectivity defined in Lacanian terms, as an affirmative and dynamic 
balance between fading, alienation and separation that initially stems from a biological 
characteristic ± and is thus engrained in bare life ± effectively enables us to read (VSRVLWR¶V 
µELRSKLORVRSK\¶ without falling into the deadlock of a bio-theo-political drift: the onto-ethical 
obligation of birth. Through the notion of subjectivity, intrinsically and always-already tied to 
intersubjectivity and otherness, ontogenetically and also biologically secondary to it, it is no 
longer biological birth that gives the metaphorical epitome of an affirmative biopolitics, of a 
paradigm of balance between communitas and immunitas. 
Arguably, Esposito turned away from subjectivity as the founding feature of 
community because subjectivity could be considered a trait, something all members of the 
community (must) have in common to be proper members of the community. It would thus 
create a threshold beyond which there are outsiders ± those from which the members of the 
community must immunise themselves and enforce a thanatopolitics. Esposito thus places life 
at the core of the communitas: in coming into being as members of the community we give 
away subjectivity (munus). He is, however, aware that this operation is equally dangerous and 
that life at the core of politics does not prevent someone from thinking that there are µOLYHV not 
worth OLYLQJ¶, for instance, as history has sadly shown us. He thus formulates a possible 
affirmative biopolitics, a sort of preventive measure, as it were, to maintain life at the core of 
politics, yet distancing it from its possible thanatopolitical drift. This operation however, as 
Chiesa and Tarizzo have shown, is not successful: affirmative biopolitics rests on a 
metaphysical vitalism that brings about equally thanatopolitical (autoimmune) drifts. Perhaps 
it is also for this reason that Esposito began to think life in terms of the impersonal, to highlight 
how much thinking µOLIH¶ enables us to question the discriminatory effects of the category of 
personhood that we inherited from Ancient Roman law. Yet he remains quite blind to the 
vitalism that grounds his reflections nevertheless. 
Thought in Lacanian terms, subjectivity (and interubjectivity) are the communitas, 
grounded on a porous balance between munus (alienation/aphanisis) and immunitas 
(separation), and stemming from life itself. Life therefore no longer needs onto-ethical ur-
protection because it is no longer the bare life of the foetus that needs protection. Rather, 
attention is shifted to post-natal care, to caring for the self and for the Other as the 
intersubjective relationship, that is to say, to the protection of subjectivised life. This does not 
shape a static ontological paradigm, but a dynamic, ontogenetic one, grounded in the continuity 
of the process of the ontogenesis of the self (and of the community), rather than in the bare life 
that precedes it. Communitas thus no longer signifies the promise of a future or an ideal 
community where affirmative biopolitics finally µZRUNV¶ It rather represents the idea of a living 
intersubjective dimension that continuously forms and re-forms itself, in a constant process of 
ontogenesis ± of the subject, of the Other, and of the community at the same time. With this I 
am not proposing that we should pursue an ideal µKHDOWK\¶ community of (bio)capitalism, 
always yet to come, for the coming of which we should subject ourselves to ever stricter 
medical controls and biological norms. I am thinking of a communitas that is not coming, that 
is always-already here, and that needs protection not from that which threatens bare life, but 
from that which threatens intersubjectivity (and with it, of course, subjectivity itself), e.g. 
hyperindividualism. While I do believe that this can be the ontogenetic foundation of an 
affirmative biopolitics, it goes beyond the remit of this paper to assess whether it could be a 
viable path to a global ethics. 
 The shift from the obligation of birth to the obligation of care, however, does return 
biopolitical ethical considerations to an intersubjective and immanent dimension, from where 
they were µVPXJJOHG¶ into the realm of the transcendental pre-natal force of life. Within such 
a framework, giving birth can no longer be considered the epitome of the munus since this is 
always-already at the biological centre of the ontogenesis of the subject and the community, in 
the form of an insurmountable, neotenic, biological inadequacy that is elevated to lack and thus 
sets the whole process of subjectification in motion. Munus, understood in these terms, no 
longer sanctions the onto-ethical obligation of birth, but rather, if anything, promotes an ethics 
founded on the obligation of care. µ(WKLFDO¶ is here understood as the ethical dimension of 
psychoanalysis: the ethics of desire, the ethical responsibility that we have towards our own 
desires. And since desire is always desire of the Other, the psychoanalytic ethics of desire thus, 
along with the lacking subject, reintroduces the responsibility we have towards each other in 
that we are lacking and desiring subjects and not (only) because we are bare lives.  
Certainly, numerous bioethical situations, which are unfortunately relatively common 
in our fragile existence as human beings, such as a pregnant woman who can only be saved by 
sacrificing the life of her unborn foetus, for example, are extreme cases that would force us to 
bring any ethics under close scrutiny. In addressing these extreme cases any norm that regulates 
a decision on the matter is unavoidably inadequate, prescriptive and, ultimately, 
sovereign/thanatopolitical ± because it does not and cannot account for single individual cases. 
An ethics grounded on the obligation of care rather than on that of birth, whose ontogenetic 
grounds I have expounded in this paper, certainly could not help in creating µEHWWHU QRUPV¶, 
capable of tackling even the extreme cases: an all-inclusive global ethics of care that could be 
an immanent, non-prescriptive moral system that makes everybody happy and healthy. It could 
not because it is not possible. And even if it were possible it would be far from desirable. What 
I hope such ethics could do is actually contribute to thinking a biopolitics capable of fostering 
and protecting the living intersubjectivity of humanity, at the same time leaving sufficient 
µSRURVLW\¶ ± as Esposito would have it ± to accommodate for the exceptionality of the 
unfortunately numerous extreme situations that life itself poses to politics and ethics, 
safeguarding the µVLQJXODU GLVFRQWLQXLW\¶ of these situations and subjectivities in spite or maybe 
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